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Adoption of real-time electricity pricing — retail prices that vary hourly to reflect changing
wholesale  prices  —  removes  existing  cross-subsidies  to  those  customers  that  consume
disproportionately more when wholesale prices are highest. If their losses are substantial, these
customers are likely to oppose RTP initiatives unless there is a supplemental program to offset their
loss. Using data on a random sample of 636 industrial and commercial customers in southern
California, I show that RTP adoption would result in significant transfers compared to a flat-rate
tariff. When compared to the time-of-use rates (simple peak/offpeak tariffs) that these customers
already face, however, the transfers drop by nearly half; even under the more extreme price volatility
scenario that I examine, 90% of customers would see changes of between a 9% bill reduction and
a 14% bill increase. Though customer price responsiveness reduces the loss incurred by those with
high-cost demand profiles, I also demonstrate that this offsetting effect is unlikely to be large enough
for most customers with costly demand patterns to completely offset their lost cross-subsidy. The
analysis suggests that adoption of real-time pricing may be difficult without a supplemental program
that compensates the customers who are made worse off by the change. I discuss how "two-part
RTP" programs, which allow customers to purchase a baseline quantity at regulated TOU rates, can
reduce the transfers associated with adoption of RTP.
Severin Borenstein





With the restructuring of electricity markets, and the disruptions that resulted in
some locations, there has been an increasing focus on eﬃcient pricing of electricity. At
the retail level, there have been studies and public policy discussions of real-time pricing
(RTP) — retail prices that vary hour-to-hour, reﬂecting wholesale price variation. Among
economists and some policy makers there is widespread agreement on the potential beneﬁts
of RTP. There is, however, uncertainty about full economic impact of RTP. Beyond the
real economic costs of implementing RTP — such as installing sophisticated meters and
adapting to more complex billing — the resulting wealth transfers also create potential
political barriers.
Wealth transfers from moving to RTP would occur because current billing practices
— a constant price at all times or simple peak/oﬀ-peak pricing (known as time-of-use or
TOU pricing) — do not cause retail prices to ﬂuctuate as much as they probably would
under RTP. Under current billing approaches, customers who consume disproportionately
high quantities when wholesale prices are high are subsidized by those who consume dis-
proportionately low quantities at those times.
In this paper, I investigate the size of the wealth transfers that would occur if electricity
systems were to change from billing large commercial and industrial customers under the
simple retail pricing structures currently in use to billing them under a real-time pricing
structure. I focus in this paper only on wealth transfers. In other work, I and others
have estimated the size of potential eﬃciency gains from RTP.2 While eﬃciency gains are
clearly important, policy discussions of RTP proposals are frequently derailed by concerns
that some customers would be harmed signiﬁcantly by ending the cross-subsidy implicit
in the current billing structures. My goal in this paper is to characterize the magnitude of
the transfers that would occur with implementation of RTP.
Using a dataset of realtime consumption patterns of more than 600 large customers
in southern California, I analyze their retail electricity costs under alternative billing ap-
proaches. I ﬁnd that moving from a ﬂat rate to RTP would indeed cause signiﬁcant wealth
transfers. Decomposing this eﬀect, however, I ﬁnd that much of the transfers that would
2 See Borenstein (2005a), Borenstein (2005b), Borenstein and Holland (forthcoming), and Holland and
Mansur (2005).
1result from a switch from a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to RTP occur even with movement from ﬂat
rates to TOU, a change that has already taken place for most large customers in the U.S.
The additional transfers due to further increasing the time-sensitivity of retail pricing from
TOU to RTP may be comparatively small.
I then investigate how much the potential losers in a switch to RTP may be able to
overcome the loss of cross-subsidy by being price responsive. That is, even if a customer
has a relatively costly demand proﬁle — consuming larger quantities at times when the
wholesale price is high — it might be able to oﬀset that loss through eﬃciency gains that
occur when it sees the actual real-time electricity price and responds. The results of this
analysis, however, suggest that the eﬀect of a customer’s own price response on its bill are
likely to be small compared to the transfer eﬀect unless the customer exhibits quite high
price elasticity.
The results suggest that it may be important to mitigate the wealth transfers from
RTP adoption in order to build a broad enough political coalition for its adoption. Where
RTP has been adopted, it has often included a “baseline” component that allows an RTP
customer to continue purchase a ﬁxed quantity of power at the regulated TOU rates. I
explain how such programs reduce the wealth transfers that would otherwise accompany
RTP adoption and by doing so probably contribute to their acceptance.
In the next section, I explain how I calculate retail rates under alternative billing
regimes. In section III, I explain the data used for customer demands and wholesale prices.
The results with non-price-responsive RTP customers are presented and analyzed in section
IV. In section V, I extend the analysis to allow for price responsiveness by the customers
who are charged real-time prices. I discuss the political economy implications of the results
in section VI and examine how “two-part” RTP programs that include a baseline quantity
purchase at regulated rates reduce the wealth transfer from RTP adoption. I conclude in
section VII.
II. Alternative Retail Billing Arrangements
Historically, electricity customers have been billed according to one of two general rate
designs: a time-independent “ﬂat” electricity price or a time-of-use (TOU) price structure
that charges higher rates during pre-designated “peak” times and lower rates at other
2times. Nearly all large electricity users are charged according to a TOU rate.3
Flat electricity rates impose a standard per-kilowatt-hour rate that is charged at all
times of the day, week, and year, while it is in force. Time-of-use rates can be as simple
as charging a diﬀerent rate during high demand months than during low-demand months,
but in practice are generally more complex. The time-of-use rate structures faced by
most of the customers I study here have ﬁve diﬀerent price levels based on the time of
year and the day/time of the week. There is a winter rate structure with a peak price
in eﬀect from 8am to 9pm on non-holiday weekdays and an oﬀ-peak rate in eﬀect at all
other times. Winter runs approximately October through May. Summer rates, which are
in eﬀect approximately June through September, have three components: Peak period is
noon-6pm on non-holiday weekdays; Shoulder period is 8am-noon and 6pm-11pm on non-
holiday weekdays, and oﬀ-peak is all other times. In my analysis of TOU rates, I assume
that the tariﬀ includes these same ﬁve TOU periods.4
Clearly, because the wholesale cost of electricity varies by the hour, there are likely
to be signiﬁcant cross-subsidies present in retail rates that vary substantially less often.
In addition, there are often cross-subsidies across classes of customers: residential versus
commercial/industrial, high versus low cost locations, and low-usage versus higher-usage
customers. Charging retail customers real-time wholesale energy prices for the electricity
they consume would eliminate cross-subsidies within the energy portion of their bills.
In order to focus on the eﬀect of the rate design, I abstract from other subsidies that
the political rate-making process might include in the rates. For the group of customers
I observe, I assume that each of the rate structures considered — ﬂat, TOU and RTP —
raises total revenue from these customers that exactly equals the total wholesale cost of
the power they consume. For a given set of wholesale prices, that is suﬃcient to fully
specify the ﬂat and RTP rates.
3 Customer bills also include a component for transmission and distribution of electricity as well as
the energy component. I do not consider the T&D component of the tariﬀ, which often includes a
demand charge that is a function of the customer’s peak usage during a period, as there is currently
little or no policy discussion of changing that.
4 In the three year period I study, the number of hours each rate is in eﬀect are: winter oﬀ-peak, 11007
hours; winter peak, 6513 hours; summer oﬀ-peak, 4959 hours; summer shoulder, 2295 hours; summer
peak, 1530 hours.
3The TOU rate, however, requires further speciﬁcation, as there are many diﬀerent
rates for the ﬁve TOU periods that would attain the revenue neutrality target. I start
by assuming that there is no cross-subsidy across the TOU periods. The resulting TOU
rate schedule has a somewhat larger peak-to-oﬀpeak price variation than exists in actual
tariﬀs, however, so I also consider a TOU tariﬀ with a ratio of prices between periods that
is closer to the ratios in tariﬀs that are actually in use.
III. Demand and Price Data
In order to estimate the potential size of wealth transfers under RTP, one needs to
have data on the demand patterns of individual customers and to analyze how a customer’s
demand co-varies with the wholesale price of electricity.5 I have obtained hourly customer-
level consumption for 636 lage industrial and customers of Southern California Edison.6
The data cover June 2001 through December 2004, though not all customers are in the
dataset for that entire period either because the business opened or closed during that
period, or because they did not have a real-time meter for that entire period. Because
few of the customers were in the program at the start, and to have a seasonal-balanced
dataset, I use data for January 2002 through December 2004.
I start by using the simplest approach to analyzing transfers, assuming that each
customer’s demand is completely price inelastic and looking at their payments under al-
ternative billing regimes. I do this for concreteness, as elasticity estimates are controversial
and there is no credible way to infer customer-level demand elasticities with any precision.
Still, in section V, I assume various levels of demand elasticity — though still the same level
for all observed customers — and examine the extent to which introducing such elasticity
reduces the losses incurred by those customers that would be harmed by a switch to RTP.
The value of this whole exercise depends on the plausibility of the distribution of
wholesale prices assumed. One could use the actual California prices from the same time
period as the customer-level data. While these prices have some credibility, there is a real
5 In discussing this covariation, I am not suggesting causality, since the customers don’t actually face
these prices.
6 These customers were randomly selected among all those in the utility’s service area that had peak de-
mand of at least 200kW and therefore qualiﬁed under 2001 state legislation to receive free installation
of a real-time meter.
4issue of how representative they are of likely prices in the future. In particular 2002 to 2004
prices in the California spot market are widely viewed as having been below long-run equi-
librium levels. The emergency building of capacity in response to the California electricity
crisis brought online so many new power plants that operators argued prices were then
too low to justify further building. A glut of capacity would almost certainly damp peak
prices more than oﬀ-peak prices, so using these prices would lead to an understatement of
the wealth transfer eﬀect that introduction of RTP would have. Thus, while I carry out
the analysis using actual spot prices, I view this as a representation of low price volatility
in long-run equilibrium. Thus, using this price series is likely to understate the magnitude
of transfers that would result.
In response to this concern, I also study potential transfers that would result using
simulated long-run equilibrium wholesale prices. The simulations are based on the model
presented in Borenstein (2005a). The model establishes a long-run perfectly competitive
equilibrium in capacity and wholesale prices for a given demand proﬁle (load duration
curve), assumed demand elasticity, and costs of diﬀerent types of production capacity.
The data used for generating the wholesale price series for this paper are not exactly the
same as in Borenstein (2005a). First, I use diﬀerent cost data than those in the earlier
paper, reﬂecting changes in capital and fuel costs since that paper was written.7 Second,
I use only demand data from the 3-year period 2002-2004. By limiting the time period of
simulation to just January 2002 through December 2004, I can impose that the resulting
prices are suﬃcient in aggregate to cover the amortized capital and variable costs of all
generators during the sample time period.
Absent large elasticity for aggregate demand, much of the capital costs are recovered
in peak hours, though exactly how many hours and how peaky the prices are depends on
the exact elasticity of aggregate demand. I create two wholesale price series with diﬀering
elasticities of aggregate demand and diﬀerent resulting peakiness of prices. I give statistics
on the resulting prices below.
7 The assumptions I use here for annual production cost are: Baseload (coal) Cost = $208247/MW +
$25/MWh; Mid-merit (CCGT) Cost = $93549/MW +$50/MWh; and Peaker (Combustion Turbine)
Cost = $72207/MW +$ 7 5 /MWh. These ﬁgures are taken from the PJM (2005), pages 82-83.
California does not have coal plants, but (a) there are coal plants in the western grid and (b) the
results are not aﬀected substantially by ﬁxing the level of baseload capacity in advance to reﬂect
nuclear and other must-take capacity.
5Table 1: Wholesale Prices in Alternative Scenarios
(all prices in $/MWh)
Time Period: 2002-2004, 26304 total hours
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Very Volatile Less Volatile Actual Southern
Simulated Prices Simulated Prices California Prices
Flat-Rate Tariﬀ 93.17 92.96 75.25
TOUA Tariﬀ — Maintaining Actual Price Ratios Among TOU Periods
Winter Oﬀ-Peak 79.29 79.11 64.04
Winter Peak 102.89 102.66 83.10
Summer Oﬀ-Peak 74.80 74.63 60.41
Summer Shoulder 95.41 95.20 77.06
Summer Peak 166.22 165.85 134.25
T O U BT a r i ﬀ—B r e a k e v e nw i t h i nE a c hT O UP e r i o d
Winter Oﬀ-Peak 69.69 69.70 70.13
Winter Peak 90.13 90.71 84.55
Summer Oﬀ-Peak 76.59 77.41 66.54
Summer Shoulder 98.55 106.42 74.53
Summer Peak 258.87 240.35 85.53
Real-time Pricing Tariﬀ
Minimum Price 65.00 65.00 10.09
Median Price 90.00 88.73 73.03
Mean Price 88.77 88.77 74.19
Maximum Price 16146.41 1525.44 262.39
Number of Hours Price is Above 205 1289 N/A
Highest Simulated Generation Marginal Cost
For each of these price series, I also had to create a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ and time-of-use
tariﬀs as the comparison points for calculating the transfers. To do so, I considered the
636 customers as a distinct customer class and calculated the rates, ﬂat and TOU, that
would exactly cover the wholesale cost of acquiring wholesale power for this customer
class. For each wholesale price series, I have calculated a single break-even ﬂat rate. I
have calculated two diﬀerent sets of TOU rates. The ﬁrst permits no cross-subsidy across
the ﬁve TOU periods; I refer to this as “Breakeven Periods TOU” or TOUB. The second
places a constraint on how much TOU rates can vary between periods so the ratio of rates
between periods is approximately equal to the ratio in Southern California Edison’s most
common TOU tariﬀs; I call this “Actual Ratio TOU” or TOUA. All or these tariﬀs are
set to assure that the revenue received exactly covers the wholesale cost of power.
6Table 1 presents the ﬂat retail price and TOU retail prices under the three diﬀerent
wholesale price distribution assumptions, as well as data on the distribution of wholesale
prices for each case. Scenarios I and II, with simulated prices, reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of
wholesale price volatility depending on the elasticity of the aggregate demand faced by
producers in the market. This aggregate demand elasticity could result from retail price
responsiveness from end users or it could be caused by supply elasticity from imports.
With less elasticity, i.e., scenario I, peaker generating plants recover their ﬁxed costs in
fewer hours with higher prices; the peak price is substantially higher in scenario I than
scenario II and the price is above the marginal cost of the simulated peaker generators in
substantially fewer hours.8
Scenario III uses the actual wholesale prices from the California ISO’s real-time bal-
ancing market for the area in which the observed customers are located. As mentioned
previously, the actual wholesale prices over this period exhibited very little volatility. I do
not include information on the number of hours in which prices exceeded the marginal cost
of peaker generation, because there is no reason to think that generators actually earned
rents that exactly covered their amortized capital costs during this period.
I present these scenarios separately from the later analysis in which the observed
customers are assumed to be able to demonstrate some price responsiveness in order to
distinguish between two eﬀects that will mitigate the size of transfers. The ﬁrst eﬀect is
from aggregate demand elasticity that damps price volatility, as is demonstrated in the
diﬀerence between scenarios I and II, the eﬀect of which is discussed in the next section.
The second eﬀect is from a customer itself responding to volatile prices by consuming less
at peak times and more at oﬀ-peak. For the observed customers, I ignore this second eﬀect
in section IV, but return to it in section V.
IV. Transfers from RTP Adoption if Customers Are Not Price Responsive
I calculate the electricity bills for each of the 636 customers in the dataset under the
four alternative billing arrangements using each of the wholesale price scenarios. The bills
include a ﬂat charge for transmission and distribution of $40/MWh. The T&D charge has
8 I do not report this last statistic for the actual southern California prices, because comparison to the
simulated cost assumptions wouldn’t be meaningful and I don’t have cost data for all of the peaker
generators in the California electricity grid.
7no eﬀect on the magnitude of the transfers, but I include it in order to give a more accurate
picture of the proportional impact from changing billing arrangements on the customer’s
electricity bill. On average T&D comprises slightly less than half of the electricity bill, so
the proportional changes in just the energy component of customer bills are slightly more
than twice as large. Throughout the calculations in this section, I assume that customers
make no change in their consumption in response to changes in the billing arrangement.9
For each wholesale price scenario, each customer’s payments under RTP can be com-
pared to their payments under a ﬂat rate billing arrangement with the same wholesale
price series. Of course, some customer bills increase compared to ﬂat rates and others
decrease, while the total revenue collected from this class of customers is held constant by
construction. The distribution across customers of percentage gains and losses is shown in
the ﬁrst line under each scenario in Table 2. The most volatile simulated prices (scenario
I) result in transfers under RTP are the most extremes upper and lower distribution tails.
Under all three scenarios, there could be substantial winners and losers, with the worst oﬀ
percentile of the distribution possibly facing bill increases of more than 50% compared to
a completely ﬂat rate billing arrangement if there were no price response by the customer.
It is worth noting that the median of these customers pays more under RTP than
under ﬂat rates — again, before accounting for any price response. This is because the
largest electricity users tend to have ﬂatter loads and thus to be winners from the switch
to RTP. Since the quantity-weighted revenues are unchanged, by construction, the fact
that the biggest customers are winners means that there are more customers that are
losers than winners.
The transfers shown in scenario I, the most volatile wholesale price scenario in table
2, suggest that there could be substantial opposition, with one-quarter of the customers
seeing their bills rise by 10% or more (as indicated by the 75th percentile change in bills).
Scenario II, with less volatile wholesale prices, shows transfers that are nearly as large as
under scenario I. This is evident from the percentile bill changes.
The magnitude of total transfers is indicated by the right-hand column of table 2.
9 By assuming that T&D is charged at a ﬂat rate, I ignore the impact of demand charges that are part
of T&D. Demand charges are a fee calibrated to the customer’s peak usage during a given period.
To the extent that a customer’s usage is correlated with system demand, demand charges increase
the size of transfers associated with departing from ﬂat rate electricity billing.
8Table 2
Distributions of Change in Customer Bills Compared to Flat-Rate Tariﬀ
(636 Customers)
PERCENTILES Total Absolute
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 99th Transfers ($mil)
Scenario I: Very Volatile Simulated Wholesale Prices
RTP -17% -12% -8% -2% 4% 10% 16% 21% 59% 123.5
TOUB -15% -9% -4% 0% 4% 9% 13% 15% 20% 91.1
TOUA -9% -5% -3% -1% 2% 5% 8% 9% 11% 54.4
Scenario II: Less Volatile Simulated Wholesale Prices
RTP -16% -10% -6% -1% 4% 9% 15% 18% 29% 103.4
TOUB -14% -9% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12% 14% 19% 86.0
TOUA -9% -5% -3% -1% 2% 5% 8% 9% 11% 54.3
Scenario III: Actual Southern California Wholesale Prices
RTP -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 3% 5% 7% 11% 27.9
TOUB -5% -3% -1% -1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 19.9
TOUA -9% -5% -3% -1% 2% 5% 8% 9% 11% 44.0
Distributions of Change in Customer Bills from TOUA to RTP
(636 Customers)
PERCENTILES Total Absolute
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 99th Transfers ($mil)
Scenario I -12% -9% -7% -2% 2% 5% 9% 14% 50% 77.4
Scenario II -9% -6% -4% -1% 2% 4% 7% 10% 22% 55.1
Scenario III -7% -5% -4% -3% -1% 1% 3% 5% 10% 26.9
This column shows the aggregate absolute value of bill changes for the 636 customers. A
switch from ﬂat rates to RTP under scenario I, for instance, would bring about a total
transfer of about $124 million among these 636 customers over the three-year period. The
ﬁrst row of scenario II shows that the transfers would be about $103 million with that
set of wholesale prices, only 16% smaller than in scenario I. The transfers would be much
smaller if the actual wholesale prices that obtained during this period, scenario III, were
indicative of future prices, $28 million over three years, 77% less than under scenario I.
Even continuing to ignore the price-dampening eﬀect of RTP, however, the actual bill
changes would be much smaller than the ﬁgures in the right-hand column. The reason is
that all of these large customers are already on TOU rates. So, from a political economy
9viewpoint, the relevant change is from TOU to RTP. As mentioned earlier, I use the ﬁve
TOU time periods (3 periods in summer, 2 in winter) under two diﬀerent sets of TOU rates
for this “customer class” of 636 customers; one set of rates (TOUB) is set so that each
time period meets its own separate revenue requirement, the other set (TOUA) meets the
revenue requirement overall while maintaining preset percentage price diﬀerences among
the time periods.
Focusing ﬁrst on scenario I, it is clear that a shift from ﬂat rates to TOU pricing
imposes a signiﬁcant proportion of the transfers that would occur by moving all the way
to RTP, but what proportion depends very much on the type of TOU. TOUB, in which
every TOU period must break even on its own, involves larger price diﬀerentials between
the periods than TOUA, which maintains the actual price ratios between periods that are
currently in use for most of these customers. Starting from ﬂat rates, TOUB causes most
of the transfers that would result from RTP. In aggregate, TOUB results in $91 million
in transfers among these customers, 74% of the transfers that would result from full RTP.
TOUA prices vary less and, as a result cause smaller transfers compared to ﬂat rates. The
$54 million in transfers under TOUA in scenario I are 44% of the level that would result
from full RTP.
The bottom panel of table 2 presents the transfers that would result from switching
from TOUA to RTP for these customers. From a political economy viewpoint, this may
be the more relevant comparison, because TOUA most closely reﬂects the current billing
arrangement for these customers. Under scenario I, the aggregate transfers are 37% smaller
with this switch than under a ﬂat-rate to RTP switch.
Under wholesale price scenario II, the story is very much the same, except the eﬀect
of TOU prices is more like RTP, because RTP prices don’t have as extreme price spikes
under scenario II as under scenario I. With scenario II, both TOUB and TOUA result in
transfers that are a higher proportion of RTP transfers (83% and 53%, respectively) than
occurs in scenario I. Under scenario II, the aggregate transfers are 47% smaller with a
TOUA to RTP switch than with a ﬂat-rate to RTP switch.
The results of using TOUA under the scenario III, the actual wholesale prices, is odd
because the inter-period price diﬀerences maintained under TOUA are actually larger than
the ratio that would result from each TOU period breaking even. This eﬀect is so strong
10that TOUA prices would cause larger transfers than would have occured under RTP with
the same wholesale prices. Still, transfers under scenario III are comparatively small under
all three alternative pricing regimes, because the wholesale prices exhibit so little volatility.
V. Transfers from RTP Adoption if Customers Respond to Price Volatility
The calculations in the previous section assumed that the observed customers would
not change their consumption in response to changes in retail electricity prices. The results
highlight how, apart from any response of the RTP customers, the volatility of wholesale
prices will aﬀect the size of the transfers. Of course, the whole point of RTP is for customers
to respond and, by doing so, to increase the eﬃciency of the entire electricity system.
In other work, I have examined the systemwide eﬃciency of such consumption changes.
Here, I examine the eﬀect of price response just on the surplus that these customers would
receive, and in particular whether the gains from price response would substantially lessen
the losses that some customers would otherwise incur with a switch to RTP.10
In order to analyze the beneﬁts or losses to customers when they exhibit price elas-
ticity, it is necessary to analyze consumer surplus instead of simply the total payments by
customers. Total payments would fail to capture the beneﬁts to consumers when they in-
crease consumption during low-price hours and would misstate the losses when a customer
reduces its bill by lowering consumption during high price periods, but also loses the value
of that consumption.
The consumption actually observed for these customers occured when they were facing
a billing regime that most closely resembled TOUA, so I use that as the baseline from which
changes in consumer surplus are measured. I then consider possible changes from the
observed consumption under alternative assumptions about the customer’s price elasticity
of demand.
10 For comparability to the results of the previous section, I use the same distribution of wholesale prices
as before. Implicitly, I am assuming that adoption of RTP by the customers in this sample would
not change the distribution of wholesale prices. I do this in order to maintain the clear distinction
between wealth transfer eﬀects caused by the distribution of wholesale prices that is exogenous to
any one customer and the mitigation of the eﬀect that is possible through the customer responding
to those wholesale prices. In aggregate, the assumption is unlikely to hold; increasing the share of
customers on RTP would dampen price volatility. The way to incorporate this eﬀect to analyze the
wealth eﬀect on any one customer moving to RTP would be simply to assume a more elastic aggregate
demand, and thus a less volatile wholesale price series, whether or not the observed customer were
to switch.
11Table 3: Distributions of Change in Customer Consumer Surplus
as a Result of Switching from TOUA to RTP Tariﬀ
(636 Customers)
Assumed
Customer PERCENTILES Share of Customers
Elasticity 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 99th with ∆CS >0
Scenario I: Very Volatile Simulated Wholesale Prices
  = 0 -50% -14% -9% -5% -2% 2% 7% 9% 12% 35%
  = −0.025 -47% -12% -8% -4% -1% 2% 7% 10% 12% 42%
  = −0.1 -37% -9% -5% -2% 1% 4% 8% 10% 12% 62%
  = −0.3 -20% -2% 1% 3% 5% 6% 9% 11% 13% 93%
Scenario II: Less Volatile Simulated Wholesale Prices
  = 0 -22% -10% -7% -4% -2% 1% 4% 6% 9% 33%
  = −0.025 -22% -10% -7% -4% -2% 1% 4% 6% 9% 36%
  = −0.1 -20% -9% -6% -3% -1% 1% 4% 7% 9% 41%
  = −0.3 -17% -6% -4% -1% 1% 3% 5% 7% 10% 62%
To be concrete, I assume that customer i has a constant elasticity of demand in hour
h, qhi = Ahi·P 
h. I assume a certain elasticity,  , and can then derive Ahi for each customer-
hour based on the assumption that qhi is its observed consumption and Ph is the TOUA
price for that hour. The customer’s change in consumer surplus from facing an RTP price
in hour h rather than the TOUA price for that hour would then be:
∆CShi =
Ahi
(  +1 )
· (P +1
TOUA − P  +1
RTP)[ 1 ]
Aggregating the result of [1] over all hours for a customer allows me to calculate its
change in consumer surplus. As a basis for comparison, I then divide the customer’s change
in consumer surplus by its total bill under TOUA pricing and observed consumption.
The distributions of the results are presented in table 3. I show results for only
scenarios I and II.11 The ﬁrst row in each scenario section indicates the distribution of
percentage change with no customer price response. This row just matches the bottom
panel of table 2 except with a reversal of the sign because I am now considering the change
in consumer surplus rather than expense.
11 Under scenario III, as shown earlier, TOUA prices vary more on average across TOU periods than
RTP prices, so the transfers from changing to RTP are a result of reduced volatility with RTP.
12The remaining three rows in each section present the distribution of change in con-
sumer surplus with varying levels of assumed price elasticity of demand on the part of
the observed customers. Unlike the results with zero elasticity from these customers, with
price responsiveness, the aggregate consumer surplus change over all customers is not zero.
By revealed preference, each customer is at least as well oﬀ as if it exhibited no price re-
sponse. Thus, with price response, the aggregate change in consumer surplus is positive
for this class of customers.
The results presented in table 3 indicate that while price responsiveness will mitigate
to some extent the losses of customers with costly demand proﬁles, it may not substantially
change the political economy of the issue. Modest price elasticity does not have as large an
eﬀect as one might hope on a customer’s net gain from RTP. For instance, under wholesale
price scenario I, with no price responsiveness, a customer at the 10th percentile of the
distribution sees a consumer surplus loss of 9% of its TOUA bill. But even if customers
have a -0.1 price elasticity in response to RTP price variation, the customer at the 10th
percentile still sees a loss of 5% of its TOUA bill. Looking across table 3, it is clear that
an elasticity of -0.1 moves the distribution of gains/losses in the positive direction, but by
only a few percentage points or less.
The right-hand column of table 3 indicates the share of customers who beneﬁt from a
switch to RTP under the assumed level of customer price elasticity, and continuing to take
the wholesale price distribution as exogenous. With no customer price elasticity, about
one-third of customers would gain consumer surplus as a result of switching from a TOUA
retail tariﬀ to RTP. Demand elasticity increases this number and shifts the distribution,
but even if these customers have an elasticity of -0.1, there are many customers who are
still worse oﬀ.12 Only with a much higher elasticity, which seems unlikely in the short run,
are a large majority of these customers likely to beneﬁt from a switch to RTP.
Demand elasticity has a greater eﬀect on customer gains in scenario I, in which whole-
sale prices are very spiky, than under scenario II, which has more moderate spikes. This re-
ﬂects the fact that the surplus gain from elasticity is larger when prices are more volatile.13
12 The magnitudes of these aggregate consumer gains are consistent with the eﬀects that Borenstein
(2005a) and Holland and Mansur (2005) ﬁnd.
13 Borenstein and Holland (forthcoming) make this point in evaluating the gains for an individual
13Unfortunately, many customers still have a very negative view price of volatility, seeing it
as introducing detrimental risk into the ﬁrm’s operations. In ongoing research with these
same data, I am investigating the potential for mitigating that risk using straightforward
hedging instruments.
VI. Two-Part RTP Programs Lessen the Wealth Tranfers from RTP Adoption
The analysis suggests that adoption of real-time pricing may be diﬃcult without
some supplemental program that compensates the customers who are made worse oﬀ by
the change. Georgia Power, which runs the oldest RTP program in the U.S., has mitigated
the lost cross-subsidy eﬀect by allowing customers to lock in a certain baseline level of
consumption at the regulated TOU rate and pay RTP only for deviations from their
baseline level of consumption. Such “two-part” RTP pricing programs are often touted
for their risk mitigation eﬀect, but they can also maintain the cross-subsidy and thus
potentially reduce political opposition to RTP.14
The way in which such two-part RTP programs allow maintenance of the pre-RTP
cross-subsidy may not be obvious at ﬁrst. In a TOU program, if the retail price of power
during each TOU period is set equal to the true cost for power during that period, then
how could a customer be cross-subsidized by being allowed to purchase at that price? The
answer is two-fold.
First, TOU prices frequently do not actually reﬂect the true peak/oﬀ-peak diﬀerence
in wholesale costs, instead underpricing the peak period and overpricing the oﬀpeak period.
In such case, assigning a customer baseline (CBL) level for TOU-rate purchases based on
the customer’s past levels of consumptions during each TOU period maintains the average
cross-subsidy that the customer received under the pre-RTP plan due to the cross-subsidy
between TOU periods. Those with disproportionate consumption during the designated
peak period will continue to beneﬁt from the fact that they consume disproportionately
at times when the retail price of the energy is on average below the wholesale cost.
A second, closely related eﬀect is somewhat more subtle: there is a within TOU
customer that moves to RTP.
14 See Barbose, Goldman and Neenan (2004) for a broad survey of RTP programs with alternative
baseline approaches.
14period cross-subsidy that is usually maintained. If under two-part RTP a customer is
permitted to buy a baseline demand pattern within a TOU period that is more costly
than the retail provider’s average acquisition cost for power it buys during that TOU
period as a whole, then the customer will continue to be cross subsidized. For example,
consider a summer peak TOU period that covers noon-6pm for all non-holiday weekdays
during June, July, August and September. Assume that the TOU price is set by the
reatil provider to cover the expected wholesale cost of the power acquisition it needs to
make during that period, so there is no cross subsidy between TOU periods. Consider
a customer that has disproprotionately high demand (compared to the retail provider’s
load) during August peak periods, which happen to be when wholesale prices are highest
in the summer. Under a TOU program, that customer is cross-subsidized because within
the summer peak TOU period it is buying a disproportionate quantity of power during
the most expensive wholesale price hours.
This within-TOU-period subsidy could continue or be eliminated under a two-part
RTP program depending on the way in which the CBL quantity — the quantity the customer
is allowed to purchase at the TOU rate — is determined. If the CBL quantity is proportional
in each hour to the retail provider’s aggregate load, then all customers are buying the same
standardized product (though diﬀering amounts of it) at a cost-based price and there is no
within-period cross-subsidy. On the other hand, if each customer is allowed to customized
its baseline quantity purchased across the hours that are within the peak TOU period —
the most common system being a baseline determined by the customer’s own consumption
in past years on the equivalent dates — then some customers will purchase more quantity
during the most expensive hours. If those customers are still allowed to buy that quantity
at the standard TOU rate — as is the case in most programs — then the cross-subsidy
will be maintained. In practice, nearly all CBLs have customized the demand pattern
of each customer’s baseline consumption to reﬂect the customer’s past consumption, thus
maintaining a signiﬁcant cross-subsidy.
Two-part RTP programs can in fact be designed to eliminate all cross-subsidy in en-
ergy costs. This can be done while still allowing customers to pre-purchase ﬁxed quantities
of power in order to reducing the risk of volatile power bills, an eﬀect that is completely
distinct from the impact on transfers. It is simple to describe two such proposals that
happen to represent opposite extremes of ﬂexibility.
15The ﬁrst, as suggested above, would oﬀer a standard product within each TOU period
that is a ﬁxed-proportion in each hour of the retail provider’s expected aggregate load. The
retail provider would price this at the expected cost of the “load slice.” No “cherry picking”
of the most expensive hours would be possible, because the only product available would
be a ﬁxed proportion of aggregate demand in all hours. So, no cross-subsidy would result.
An alternative proposal oﬀers complete ﬂexibility, but sets separate prices for each
hour. Under this proposal, the retail provider would set a forward price for each hour
o ft h ec o m i n gy e a rb a s e do ni t sb e s tf o r e c a s to fw h o l e s a l ep r i c e( t h r o u g ha na n a l y s i so f
expected demand and supply drivers). The retail provider would price each hour so that
there is no expected cross-subsidy across hours. A customer would then be allowed to craft
its own baseline quantity, potentially buying forward a diﬀerent quantity for each hour of
the year.15
Each of these two proposals permits the risk management function that is often sug-
gested as the basis for two-part RTP programs while eliminating the cross-subsidies the
exist under the pre-RTP system. Yet, neither of these programs has been adopted any-
where in the U.S. Instead, customized baselines have been used or baselines purchases have
simply been made available at prices below the expected wholesale costs. This suggests
that the designs of the customer baseline programs have been aimed at mitigating the loss
of cross-subsidy as well as reducing the perceived bill risk associated with RTP.
Finally, note that not even the most sophisticated two-part RTP program is unlikely
to completely eliminate wealth transfers that would result from RTP adoption. Even if
every customer were required to pre-purchase their expected hour-by-hour demand at the
regulated TOU rates, the stochastic components in consumption and real-time wholesale
prices would cause some transfers. On the unexpectedly hot summer day, prices would
rise and those customers who see the greatest increase in their consumption above their
expected level would be hurt the most. Thus, those customers whose demand experiences
unanticipated shocks that are most strongly postively correlated with shocks to system
demand and price would still take a wealth hit. This would be the case even under a
two-part RTP program in which each customer buys in advance their customized expected
demand quantity for each hour.
15 Borenstein (2005b) describes this proposal in greater detail.
16In ongoing research, I am studying the empirical magnitude of the wealth transfer
mitigation that result from various forms of two-part RTP programs.
VII. Conclusions
Introducing real-time electricity pricing is likely to harm some customers by remov-
ing the existing cross-subsidies to customers that consume disproportionately more when
wholesale prices are highest. Those customers are likely to oppose RTP initiatives if their
potential loss is substantial and there is no supplemental program to oﬀset their loss. Us-
ing data on a sample of 636 industrial and commercial customers in southern California,
I’ve shown that implementing RTP results in signiﬁcant transfers compared to a ﬂat-rate
tariﬀ. Half or more of these transfers, however, occur with just a change from ﬂat-rate
to time-of-use pricing, a change that has already taken place for the customers in this
sample, and for most large industrial and commercial customers in the U.S. Still, current
TOU tariﬀs probably understate the long-run equilibrium cost diﬀerential between peak
and oﬀ-peak periods, thus reducing the transfer caused by such rates and increasing the
additional transfer that would result from moving to full RTP.
One hope for broader RTP support is that customers may help themselves under
RTP by reducing consumption when prices are high and consuming more when prices
are low. While this price responsiveness generates substantial eﬃciencies in aggregate (as
shown by Borenstein (2005a)), I demonstrate that it is unlikely to be large enough for
most customers with costly demand patterns to overcome their lost cross-subsidy. Even if
customers exhibit real-time price elasticities of -0.1, I conclude that a large share of them
would still be losers under RTP.
The analysis makes clear that in the political economy of retail electricity pricing there
is likely to be a role for programs that mitigate the wealth transfers from RTP adoption
while still achieving the eﬃciency gains. I’ve shown that “two-part” RTP programs, which
allow customers to buy a baseline quantity at a regulated rate, fulﬁll this function under
their typical implementation.
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